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PROXIMATE CAUSE IN MICHAEL MOORE'S ACT AND CRIME
LEO KATZt
I.
The object of this essay is to take issue not with what Michael

Moore has to say about the nature of the criminal act, but with
some of what he says about the relationship of that act to the other
elements of a crime, most notably the requirement of proximate
causation. Moore's conception of that relationship emerges with
particular clarity in his discussion of what he calls "Some Critical
Legal Silliness about the Act Requirement."' Indeed, he says the
only reason for even bothering to dispose of that "silliness" is that
doing so affords us a clearer view of the precise role the act
2
requirement plays within the context of the entire offense.
The silliness in question is Mark Kelman's point that the act
requirement "is vacuous in the sense that the requirement can be
manipulated to yield whichever result one wants."' To understand
both Kelman's point and Moore's criticism of it, consider the two
cases which both Kelman and Moore use to state their positions:
People v. Decina4 and Martin v. State.' In each case the defendant
tried to defend on the grounds that he had not committed a
voluntary act, but only in the latter case did this defense persuade
the court.' Decina involved an epileptic who, while driving his car,
had a seizure and ran over several young children. 7 He was
charged with manslaughter.'
He argued that since he did not
commit a voluntary act when he ran the victims over, he could not
be convicted. 9 The court, however, focused on the fact that the
defendant had committed a voluntary act when he stepped into his
car, and rejected his argument."0 Martin involved an intoxicated

t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
'MICHAEL

S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME:

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS

IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 35-37 (1993).

See id. at 37.
s Id. at 35.
2

4 138

N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
' 17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Crim. App. 1944).
See id. at 427.
" See Decina, 138 N.E.2d at 801, 803.
8 See id. at 803.
9 See id.
10 See id. at 803-04.
6
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man who, for reasons not revealed in the opinion, was arrested and
taken out of his home, to which he reacted by firing off a fusillade
of profanities." Because of his "boisterous ... conduct ... and
profane discourse," he was charged with the crime of being drunk
in public. 2 He defended on the grounds that he did not voluntarily go out in public but had been taken there by the police; therefore, he claimed, the act requirement was not met.'1 This time the
14
court accepted the defense.
Kelman argues that the courts' application of the act requirement in these cases is plainly capricious." In Decina, the court
engaged in what he calls "broad time-framing": it looked beyond
the mere moment at which the defendant actually ran someone over
and took account of his conduct just prior to the accident, namely
his stepping into the car to drive. 6 Stepping into the car, the court
reasoned, did not occur during an epileptic seizure and therefore
met the voluntary act requirement. 7 In Martin, the court merely
looked at the moment at which the defendant was taken out of his
home. Being forcibly taken out of his home was not a voluntary act,
the court reasoned, and therefore Martin's conviction violated the
voluntary act requirement.'" Nothing, says Kelman, would have
prevented the court from focusing only on the moment of injury in
Decina and finding that there was no voluntary act in that case, or
from focusing on the defendant's decision to drink in Martin and
finding that there was a voluntary act in that case after all. 9
Moore says there really is no time-framing problem at all.
Kelman just doesn't understand how the act requirement fits with
the other elements of an offense.
If there were a 'time-framing' choice to be made in criminal cases,
Kelman is right in his observation that there would be no principled way to make it. But where did Kelman get his assumption
that there is such a choice to be made? Every competent teacher
of elementary criminal law that I know teaches the act requirement
" See Martin, 17 So. 2d at 427.
12 Id.
s See id.
14See id.
'5 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 35 (citing Mark Kelman's article, Interpretive

Constructionin the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591,600-05, 618-20, 63740 (1981) and book, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 92-93 (1987)).
6
1

Id. at 36.

17See Decina, 138 N.E.2d at 803-04.
'9

See Martin, 17 So. 2d at 427.
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 35-37.
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in the following way: if, from the big bang that apparently began
this show to the heat death of the universe that will end it, the
court can find a voluntary act by the defendant, accompanied at
that time by whatever culpable mens rea that is required, which act
in fact and proximately causes some legally prohibited state of
affairs, then the defendant is prima facie liable for that legal harm.
There is no 'time-framing' choice here. If there is any point in
time where the act and mens rea requirements are simultaneously
satisfied, and from which the requisite causal relations exist to
some legally prohibited state of affairs, then the defendant is
prima facie liable. The presupposition of Kelman's entire analysis
is simply (and obviously) false.
Consider Decina again. The New York court rightly decided
that Decina's bodily movements at the time of the accident were
not acts, and that Decina's movements beginning to drive were
acts. The court did not, however, arbitrarily focus on the earlier
time because it had arbitrarily chosen a broad time-frame in which
to look for a voluntary act. Rather, the court looked at all possible
times and found one where Decina not only acted (in beginning to
drive) but did so recklessly (in light of prior seizures he was aware
of the risk to others posed by his driving), which reckless act
2

caused the victim's death.

1

As to the Martin case, Moore writes:
Kelman thinks that the ... court could justify its decision (of no
voluntary act by Martin) only by 'narrow time-framing'; for a broad
time-framing would reveal earlier acts by Martin that were
voluntary, namely, the taking of drinks. What Kelman overlooks
is that those earlier acts by Martin were not the proximate cause
of his being drunk in public. The police officers' intentional
placing of Martin in a public place constitutes an intervening cause
on anyone's reading of that notion, making Martin21not a proximate cause of the legally prohibited state of affairs.
The most crucial point in all of this, the one that propels the
rest of the analysis forward, is Moore's assertion that in applying the
act requirement the court is to do the following: find a moment
sometime between the big bang and the heat death of the universe
at which the defendant engaged in a voluntary act, did so with the
right kind of mens rea, and thereby proximately caused the harm prohibited by the statute. Plausible though this picture is, I believe

20

1Id.

21 Id.

at 35-36 (footnote omitted).
at 36-37 (footnote omitted).
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it is not correct. In particular, I shall argue that what is amiss with
it is this: just because a defendant has committed an act with the
requisite mens rea (which is neither justified nor excused), and that
act is proximately connected with the harm the statute forbids him
from bringing about, does not mean he is guilty under that statute.
What's more, even in cases in which the defendant is guilty, we
would be wrong to focus too heavily on the mens rea-accompanied
act proximately causing the statutory harm, as we decide on the
extent of the defendant's blameworthiness.
To put the matter slightly less abstractly, there are plenty of
cases in which a defendant commits an act proximately (and
intentionally) causing death, but is not liable for any kind of
homicide. (Note: I am not assuming that any justification or excuse
is available.) And in those cases in which he really is guilty of some
kind of homicide, the mens rea accompanying the act proximately
causing death is not the crucial determinant of the wickedness of
the homicide.
In the next Section, I shall offer a series of such examples in
which a defendant proximately causes harm by an act that is
accompanied by the required kind of mens rea but is nonetheless
not guilty of anything. Each of the examples is vulnerable to
various challenges. But, rather than dealing with those challenges,
I shall simply let the cumulative impact of the examples do its work
and, in the Section following, offer a more general argument as to
why examples like these are bound to exist in a criminal law system
that is not out-and-out utilitarian. In the final Section I shall revisit
cases like Decina and propose an alternative analysis to Moore's.
II.
What follows, then, are my examples of defendants who commit
intentional acts proximately causing a forbidden state of affairs, for
which they cannot be held liable.
(1) In their article Ducking Harm,22 two philosophers, Christopher Boorse and Roy Sorensen, offer a series of startling examples
to illustrate the dramatically different treatment we accord deaths
caused by (what they call) "ducking" and deaths caused by (what
they call) "shielding." Their essay opens with a joke that captures
the distinction especially memorably:

Christopher Boorse & Roy A. Sorensen, DuckingHarm, 85J. PHIL. 115 (1988).
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[T]wo campers, Alex and Bruce, meet a ravenous bear. As Alex
grabs his running shoes, Bruce points out that no one can outrun
a bear. "I don't have to outrun him," Alex replies. "I only have
to outrun you." Few ... will criticize Alex for running away full
tilt, or even for using his new Sauconys. But suppose Alex instead
ties Bruce's ankles, or knocks Bruce unconscious and throws him
to the bear. Alex is now blameworthy in ethics and in law. The
result is the same in both cases: Bruce's death. Further, Alex may
know the result to be the same if he knows he can outrun Bruce.
Nonetheless most people sharply distinguish the two acts.23
The joke is followed with a potpourri of further illustrations:
(al)

(a2)

(cl)

(c2)

Angela, at the end of a movie ticket line, sees X about to
shoot a .22 automatic at her. Angela knows that a .22
bullet will kill one person but not two. Angela leaps aside;
the bullet kills Brenda, who is next in line.
Same as (al), but Angela grabs Brenda and moves her in
front as a shield; the bullet kills Brenda.
Alison is one of 25 U.S. government officials on an
airplane, each with a briefcase bearing an official seal.
Terrorist hijackers announce they will kill one American
per hour until their demands are met. Surreptitiously
Alison covers her seal with a Libya Air sticker. The
terrorists pass her briefcase and shoot Beatrice, the next
American.
Same as (cl), but Alison has no Libyan sticker. Instead
she switches briefcases with Babette, a French novelist,
while she is in the bathroom. The terrorists shoot
24
Babette.

On a recent program on my local public television station, a
detective actually converted these examples into practical advice on
how to keep yourself from becoming a crime victim. (While I doubt
he had read the original Boorse-Sorensen article, he did tell the
bear joke by way of introducing his subject.) Make sure, the
detective advised, that you are a "tough target." What is a tough
target?
Here we've got two people. Now these two people have two apartments, and these apartments are right across the back porch from
23 Id. at 115-16 (footnote omitted).
24 Id. at 116.
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each other. If you went up the back stairs, you will find that they
have a common back porch. These two apartments are exactly the
same. Except this woman, she went to the pet store and she
bought a dog bowl. She bought a big dog bowl. She filled it with
water, wrote the word "Killer" on it, and put it outside her door.
Now when Mickey the Moke comes up the back stairs to do one of
these apartments, which one is he not going to pick? See how easy
it is? Not being selected is the most important thing that you can
25
do. Tough targets are not selected.
I am not actually interested in this essay in exploring the intriguing
distinction between ducking and shielding. Rather, I am interested
in the ducking phenomenon all by itself. What makes it interesting to
me is that it seems to me a pretty unequivocal illustration of an act that
proximately causes harm, but does not entail liability.
Now you might object that the reason the ducker escapes
liability in the foregoing examples is that she faced such a dire
threat. But I don't think so. Our reaction to those examples would
not change if the threat the defendant sought to escape were only
a relatively minor one, and the damage she caused by ducking were
death. Suppose, for instance, that Angela had been wearing a bullet
proof vest and that the impact of the bullet would at worst have
thrown her to the ground. She would still have been entitled to
duck. Or, suppose that Alison had known she would only be
manhandled by the terrorists (perhaps because one of them knows
her), but that Beatrice would be killed. She too would still have
been entitled to duck (which in this case, of course, means covering
her suitcase with an Air Libya sticker).
(2) Similar to, but not identical with, the above cases is that
depicted in Harry Mulisch's novel The Assault26 (turned into an
award-winning movie in the mid 1980s). In the waning days of the
German occupation of Holland during World War II, the Dutch
Resistance assassinates a Dutch police inspector who has been
collaborating with the Gestapo. The inspector is shot in front of a
house that is occupied by a sailor and his daughter, neither of whom
have anything to do with the killing. The two understand that the
Germans follow a simple principle of reprisal: Any Dutch civilian
within suitable physical proximity of the killing will be punished.
5 Street Smarts: How to Avoid Being a Victim (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 1,

1992).

26 HARRY MULISCH, THE ASSAULT

(1982).

(Claire N. White trans., Pantheon Books 1985)
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This will mean, at a minimum, torching their house (which would
cost the old sailor a reptile collection he treasures dearly), a fair
amount of manhandling, and, quite possibly, outright execution.
The two decide to avert this potential calamity by shifting the corpse
to the doorstep of one of their neighbors-who are subsequently
killed by the Germans.
To remove distracting and irrelevant complications of international law or the law of war from this example, replace the Germans
with a band of terrorists and keep every other fact the same. Now
it is clear, I think, that the old sailor and his daughter have
knowingly and proximately caused great harm to their neighbors,
but nevertheless (without even getting into issues of duress or
necessity) cannot be held guilty of homicide, given the way in which
they did so.
(3) Ethelbert sees someone drowning in the middle of the lake.
He jumps in to rescue him, takes hold of him, and starts for the
shore. He then discovers that the victim is someone he has long
regarded as his mortal enemy. Before reaching shore, he sloughs
him off, as it were, and swims back by himself. His act of sloughing
off the victim proximately caused his death. All the same, I do not
believe he would be liable for any kind of homicide.
(4) Here is a story told about the 19th century financier Daniel
Drew:
[N]othing brought more glee to the Old Bear's craggy features, or
made his gray eyes glint more merrily, than the knowledge that he
was unloading [stock] on a dupe. Henry Clews tells how once on
Wall Street, after being severely squeezed in the market, Drew was
made the butt of much jesting, especially by a group of young
operators who literally laughed in his face. One evening he
appeared at a club that the young men frequented, where he
seemed to be looking for someone whom he failed to find.
Intensely preoccupied, time and again he drew forth from his
pocket a big white handkerchief to wipe his brow. Just before he
left, one last flurry of the handkerchief tossed out a small piece of
paper that, apparently unseen by him, fluttered to the floor, where
one of the young men covered it at once with his foot. After Drew
had left, they examined it and found an order to his broker to buy
all the Oshkosh stock he could get. The young men were
electrified: here was advance warning of a big rise in Oshkosh!
Immediately they formed a pool and bought 30,000 shares the
next day, following which the stock plummeted, giving them a
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fearful loss. Of course the slip
of paper had been planted and the
27
stock had come from Drew.
Drew intentionally and proximately caused the other speculators to
form a false belief, to buy stock on the basis of that belief, and to
suffer a loss as a result. Yet he is not guilty of fraud or anything
else of the kind.
(5) When Lincoln was first running for Congress, his opponent
suggested that Lincoln was not a truly religious man, that he was
something of a free-thinker if not an actual atheist.2 Lincoln's
first biographer, his long-time law partner, William Herndon, leaves
little doubt that all this was essentially correct." How did Lincoln
cope with these damaging charges? He published a statement in a
newspaper that satisfied most people that the charges were
unfounded.3" So had Lincoln lied? Not quite. For in the statement, as later critics noted, he only said that he had "'never denied
the truth of the Scriptures.'""1 Alas, notes Edmund Wilson, "he
does not say that he affirms this truth."12 Lincoln wrote that: "'I
have never spoken with intentional disrespect of religion in general,
or of any denomination of Christians in particular,'" 3 which, as
Wilson notes, does not say that he is actually Christian. 4 Lincoln
wrote that he would not support any man for office "'whom I know
to be an open enemy of, and scoffer at, religion'" because no man
"'has the right to insult the feelings, and injure the morals, of the
community in which he may live.'" 5 This explanation again falls
short of actually refuting the charges of his opponents. Nevertheless, it was clearly so taken by the public.
Lincoln had intentionally and proximately caused the public to
form a false impression of his religious beliefs. Had he done so by
lying, he would have done wrong. By doing it this way, he was all
right.
27 CLIFFORD BROWDER, THE MONEY GAME IN OLD NEW YORK: DANIEL DREW AND

HIS TIMES 117 (1986).
28
See EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 101 (1962).

See
o See
s' Id.
32 Id.
" Id.
2

id. at 99, 101-02.
id. at 101.
(quoting William Herndon).
(quoting William Herndon).

34 See id.

" Id. at 101-02 (quoting William Herndon).
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(6) Veronica is a fiercely competitive, highly successful piano
virtuoso. She is on the verge of conceiving a child, but like the
father of Johann Strauss, she is possessed of a pathological fear that
her child might prove to be more successful in its chosen field than
she. To make sure this does not happen, she swallows, prior to
conception, a drug that is known to affect a woman's genes in a
particular way: it alters them such that any child this woman should
later conceive would be missing an index-finger. In due course, she
conceives and gives birth to a child without an index-finger. That
injury, I would say, she has proximately caused,yet she would not be guilty
of anythingfor causing it.
What about the objection that what she has done is no different
than cutting off her child's finger after it has been born or injuring
the fetus while it is still in the womb, acts for which we would, in
fact, hold her liable? Well, suppose that prior to taking the drug,
she says to herself that she will not actually go ahead and conceive
unless a lawyer and a moral philosopher tell her it's all right to go
ahead and do so. It then becomes hard to see that she is doing
anything wrong when she ingests the drug. After all, ingesting the
drug if she will not conceive is unobjectionable. And ingesting the
drug if she will only conceive if it is the moral thing to do is also
unobjectionable. So, when she subsequently consults the lawyer and
the moral philosopher, what should they tell her? How can they not
tell her to go ahead and conceive? Surely, that is the advice they
would give to any would-be mother who thinks about conceiving but
hesitates because of such a comparatively minor genetic defect as a
missing index-finger. Why would they give any different advice to
someone who through her own fault ended up in this position?
This too, then, I consider a strong example of an act (the ingestion of
the drug) proximately causing harm but not constituting a crime.
(7) Septimus is a surgeon who has been curious about what it
would be like to operate on someone while he, Septimus, is in a
slight state of intoxication. Realizing that to do so would be
criminally reckless, he never actually goes through with the
experiment. Instead, he makes painfully sure to be quite free of
alcohol when he is actually on duty. But when he is off duty, he
maintains a constant state of slight intoxication. His reason for
doing so is somewhat devious. He hopes that some day an
emergency will arise in which he is the only person with surgical
skills far and wide, and despite his intoxication, his help will be
eagerly sought. This does indeed happen. In the course of
operating, Septimus's hands shake quite violently and the patient
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suffers a good deal of damage which he would not have had
Septimus been sober.
I would say about this case: Septimus's policy of maintaining a
constant state of light intoxication so he could find out what it would be
like to operate drunk constitutes an act (or many acts, if you prefer) that
proximately caused the patient's injuries, but that nevertheless Septimus is
beyond reproach, at least legal reproach.
(8) Obediah hates his neighbor's dog, who has on several
occasions strayed onto his land and made off with some of his son's
toys. This offense, let us suppose, is not enough to entitle Obediah
to shoot the dog. What Obediah does instead is to approach the
dog and remove the toy in a sudden, startling, and aggressive
manner. This leads the dog to yap at his trousers, which in and of
itself does not entitle Obediah to shoot him yet. Nevertheless, he
deals with the attack on his trousers in a way likely to provoke the
dog even further, tearing them away suddenly and in a manner most
likely to arouse the animal. This sort of escalation game he
carefully carries on until he has driven the dog to the point of
actually making a dangerous assault on him. Whereupon, he kills
the dog in self-defense. Obediah's actions have proximately caused
the dog's death, and yet are perfectly legal, even though killing the
dog outright would not have been. What he has done does not
disturb the proximity relationship between his actions and the
outcome but does render it legal.
(9) An heiress hears rumors that there is a gang of terrorists out
there planning to kidnap the children of prominent families and to
humiliate the parents by forcing the children to perform criminal
acts at gunpoint. Imagine that the heiress actually finds the idea of
participating in, say, a bank heist alluring, though she would never
of course do so on her own. In fact, she comes to daydream about
the possibility of being kidnapped by this gang, all of which she
confesses in great detail to her diary. She grows so enchanted by
the idea that she deliberately dissolves her private army of bodyguards hoping to make the gang's job easier. In due course, she is
kidnapped and forced at gunpoint to carry out a bank robbery.
When she is charged with bank robbery, she defends on the grounds
of necessity, saying that if she had not done what she was asked to
do she would have been killed. She would, I think, be acquitted
despite those telltale diary entries. Yet, by her action of dispatching
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the bodyguards, she would have intentionally and proximately
36
caused the bank robbery.
(10) Matilda's tyrannical husband has a weak heart, and she is
silently hoping for his death. A doctor suggests to her that she
learn CPR so that she will be able to cope with a possible emergency
until an ambulance arrives. Realizing that if she knows CPR, she
will be under a legal obligation to render help in case such an
emergency should occur, she declines to learn it. She goes so far
that whenever a certain public-interest message is broadcast on her
television giving brief instruction in CPR, she turns it off. In due
course, her husband has a heart attack and dies before the ambulance can reach him. It is quite clear that had his wife been able to
apply CPR, he would have come away unscathed. I think we can say
at least this about Matilda's refusal to learn CPR: her deliberate
avoidance of opportunities to learn CPR constituted an act that
proximately caused her husband's death. Yet I do not think that
she can be held guilty of murder for avoiding to learn CPR.
(11) Alaric's neighbor has a loud, but harmless dog whom Alaric
hates and would like to see dead. One day Alaric learns that the
dog has somehow gotten lost in the neighborhood and is being
searched for, so far to no avail. Alaric decides to go on a long walk
around the neighborhood with a devious design: he hopes that the
loud dog will startle him and cause him to reasonably mistake it for
some other more aggressive, more dangerous beast, which he will
then be entitled to kill in mistaken self-defense. And this is exactly
what happens. Alaric has intentionally and proximately caused the
dog's death. Yet I do not see that he would be liable in any way.
(12) Ulysses, a dedicated psychologist who believes in the value
of introspection, wants to experiment with the effects of alcohol on
himself. He has been a teetotaler for many years because he
remembers that in his youth the consumption of even slight
amounts of alcohol rendered him very short-tempered, aggressive,
and violent, although by no means irrational or insane. Thus,
before conducting his experiments, he goes to extraordinary lengths
to make sure that the room to which he will confine himself while
he is under the influence is inaccessible to any other human being.
s6 You might say that there is no proximate causation here because of the
intervening actions of the kidnappers, but that need not be so. We could have them
perform all the actions they needed to take before she dispatched her bodyguards.
Thereafter, everything is set in motion, either because machines or ignorant
intermediaries carry out the commands previously issued by the kidnappers.
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But because of a fluke or because of the malicious intervention of
some colleague, somehow or other a stranger ends up wandering
into the room just after Ulysses has imbibed. Some incautious
remarks of the unwelcome visitor so enrage Ulysses that he ends up
punching him out badly.
Ulysses has intentionally and proximately injured the visitor. He
has no excuse or justification for doing so. Yet he should not be
found guilty of an assault. I view it as an imperfection of the
current law that it would find him guilty.
III.
My claim is this: In any system of morality that is even slightly
nonutilitarian, that is, which is even slightly deontological in
character, there are many acts that proximately cause harm which
are nonetheless beyond reproach. To show how and why this is so,
I propose to take a look at Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous trolley
37
problem.
The trolley in question is heading down an incline when
Edward, its driver, discovers that the brakes aren't working. On the
track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they
will not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur
leading off to the right, and Edward can turn the trolley onto it.
Unfortunately, there is one person on the right-hand track. Edward
can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning
the trolley,"8 which would mean the death of the five. What to do?
Nearly everyone would say that it is all right to turn the trolley, and
many would go further and say that it is downright obligatory to turn
the trolley.3 9 Everyone, it seems, is inclined to behave like a good
utilitarian.
The real problem with the trolley problem arises when we
juxtapose it with another case-the case of the utilitarian surgeon.
The surgeon in question has five patients all of whom need
transplants. One needs a heart, two need kidneys, and two need
lungs. He considers killing off a healthy patient who has walked in
for his annual checkup so as to redeploy his organs for the benefit
37

See JUDITH J. THOMSON, Killing Letting Die and the Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS,
RISK 78 (William Parent ed., 1986) [hereinafter THOMSON, Letting

RESTITUTION, AND

Die]; JUDITH J. THOMSON, The Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK,
supra, at 94 [hereinafter THOMSON, The Trolley Problem].
38 See THOMSON, Letting Die, supra note 37, at 80-81.
39 See THOMSON, The Trolley Problem, supra note 37, at 94.
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of the other five. Nearly everyone would agree that that cannot be
done. However strong one's utilitarian instincts are, this case brings
40
out the residual deontologist within him.
The challenge has been to explain what makes the trolley
scenario different from the surgeon scenario and warrants a
utilitarian response in the former and not the latter. But that is not
something I mean to get into here. Rather, I want to put the
problem to a different use. What I will show is that if you are
enough of a deontologist to concede that the surgeon is not entitled
to cut up his walk-in patient, you are then committed to a system of
morality in which it is frequently acceptable to commit an act
accompanied by the requisite mens rea which proximately causes
death or other kinds of harm.
Consider my own twisted version of the trolley hypothetical.
Imagine that Edward, the driver of the unstoppable trolley, cannot
make up his mind about what to do, and ends up running over the
five instead of the one. Miraculously, he does not kill them, but
only hurts them badly. Nevertheless, they are certain to die from
their injuries unless furnished with certain transplant organs:
namely, two kidneys, two lungs, and one heart. Suppose now that
the driver deeply regrets not having turned the trolley and
announces:
It would have been all right had I turned the trolley and thereby
killed the one for the sake of the five. I hesitated because I
wanted to give the matter more thought. Upon reflection, I have
decided it would indeed have been better to have killed the one to

save the five, and I want to make up for my earlier omission. The
victim really isn't entitled to protest: he is giving up nothing other
than what I would have been entitled to take from him anyway.
Does this argument work? Of course not. There is no going back
on the decision to run into the five instead of the one. The mere
fact that by killing the one we would simply bring about a state of
the world we were entitled to bring about minutes earlier does not
entitle us to do so now.
What this twisted version of the trolley hypothetical, this
superimposition of the surgeon scenario on that of the trolley
hypothetical, serves to do is to highlight a feature of the deontological point of view that tends to go unnoticed-its inherent formalism,
See THOMSON, Letting Die, supra note 37, at 80 (presenting a comparable
hypothetical).
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or as the economist would say, its path-dependence. The very same
result brought about by one path is forbidden, but brought about
by another is acceptable.
There may be some readers who will be more willing to accept
this lesson if it is taught with the help of an example less artificial
than the twisted version of the trolley problem. It is for those
readers mostly that the next three paragraphs are intended.
Imagine a doctor-administrator who is constantly engaged in
decisions of medical triage: whether somebody should be put on
certain scarce life-support systems, whether somebody should be
taken off, who should be put on next, that sort of thing. It will
happen that the doctor has put someone on life-support who, after
a few- days have passed, only stands a modest chance of really
benefitting from it by making an eventual recovery. In that time,
other patients will have arrived at the hospital who stand a much
better chance of benefitting from the very same system, but who will
have to be denied access because a less promising patient is already
utilizing the equipment. The doctor is sorely tempted to just
unhook the unpromising patient because he knows that by doing so
he can save several other lives, while only accelerating the death of
one already doomed patient. But he can't. To do that, he realizes,
would be tantamount to organ-harvesting. He feels bad about it,
but realizes that there is nothing he can do.
Until, that is, inspiration strikes. He remembers that there are
different life-support systems on the market. Some of these systems
require little servicing or refilling. Others must be rotated out every
few days, and replaced by other systems while being serviced. In
fact, the equipment that requires frequent rotation is slightly better
than the equipment that does not, but most hospitals find it too
bothersome to use, so they don't.4 1 What occurs to the doctor is
that if he buys equipment that regularly has to be disconnected and
replaced and serviced, he gets a flexibility he didn't have before.
Once a patient has been disconnected, and once the decision has to
be made whether to hook him back up to the new machine or to use
that machine for someone else who is more promising, it's a whole
new ballgame. Surely we are entitled to ask before deciding whom
to hook up to some life-support system who would most likely
41 It is, let us say, similar to the difference between extended- and daily-wear
contact lenses. The latter may be better but are more of a bother.
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benefit from it, and that way we can forget about the unpromising
patient and devote all of our attention to the more promising one.
To put the matter differently, with this new equipment the
doctor-administrator is in the position of the trolley driver rather
than the organ-harvesting surgeon. Just as the trolley driver is
entitled to turn his trolley in whatever direction will maximize the
lives saved, or minimize the lives lost, so the doctor-administrator
is surely entitled to wheel his life-support system in whatever
direction maximizes the lives saved, that is, minimizes the lives lost.
The only difference between the doctor-administrator and the
trolley driver is that by turning the trolley in a certain direction the
driver causes the death of the person in whose direction he turned
the trolley and prevents the deaths of the persons away from whom
he turned the trolley. In the case of the life-support system, it's the
other way around: the administrator causes the death of the person
away from who he turns the life-support system and he prevents the
death of the person in whose direction he turns the life-support
system. But that is not an important difference. Fundamentally,
the hospital administrator is now like the trolley driver and has the
flexibility of the trolley driver as opposed to that of the surgeon.
That deontological systems are highly formalistic is only one
lesson of these "twisted trolley" variations. The more pertinent
lesson for this essay is that it frequently is possible to restructure a
transaction one has in view so as to achieve a seemingly forbidden

end by other means. The restructured version of the transaction will
almost invariably involve the actor's committing an act that intentionally
and proximately brings about theforbidden result. If nothing else, the very
act of restructuringwillfit that bill.
IV.
How does the foregoing change the analysis in cases like Martin
and Decina? To see this most clearly, consider the facts of a wellknown corporate law case-or rather, my stylized version thereof-in
which a board of directors was charged with having negligently
approved a disadvantageous merger deal for their shareholders."
Although the negligence in question was civil rather than criminal,
that's conceptually irrelevant here. The facts were these: the
company's CEO put before his board a merger proposal. The
board, without much debate, scrutiny, or background information,

42 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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hastily approved the deal and submitted it for a shareholder vote.
Shortly thereafter, the directors began to have second thoughts,
convened another meeting to reconsider the deal, and took various
corrective measures to let the shareholders know that they should
not approve the deal.4 3 Ordinarily, these measures would have
sufficed to prevent a bad deal from actually being approved by the
shareholders. Due to some special, but by no means extraordinary,
circumstances the shareholders ended up not fully understanding
the undesirability of the merger and therefore approved it." The
question for the court was: Is the board blameworthy for the
damage wrought by this merger? Under the Moorean approach we
would have to say: Yes, of course. They committed an act of negligence when they approved the deal and that negligent act resulted
in damages. The approach the court actually took was to take
account of the board's corrective, even if futile, efforts.4 5 Which
is what I too would do.
We can easily adapt the facts of this case to Decina. Change
Decina's disability from epilepsy to intoxication. Knowing that he
is intoxicated, Decina starts to drive. While driving, he exerts
himself stupendously to counteract the effects of his intoxication,
and very nearly manages to overcome them completely, meaning
that his driving is nearly indistinguishable from that of a sober
driver. Nevertheless, he has an accident. Under the Moorean
approach, we would say: Decina is guilty of manslaughter because
he acted with criminal negligence in starting to drive while in a state
of intoxication and that negligence proximately caused death.
(Decina's efforts to drive carefully need not break the chain of
proximate causation.) If, on the other hand, we take the approach
of the court in the corporate law case, we would rate the
defendant's blameworthiness much lower than that. But to be able
to do that we would have to give up on the Moorean fixation on the
moment in time at which the defendant committed an act accompanied by the right kind of mens rea and proximately resulting in a
forbidden state of affairs.

11 See id. at 864-70.
11 See id. at 870.
'5 See id. at 874, 881-88. The court did, however, reverse the Court of Chancery's
decision and hold the directors liable. See id. at 893.

